Presentation
Late Breaking Results: Configurable Ring Oscillators as a Side-Channel Countermeasure
DescriptionIn this work, a countermeasure against power analysis side channel attacks is developed.
This countermeasure uses ring oscillators with runtime-configurable chain lengths to generate noise to hide the effects of the secret intermediate values on the device's power consumption.
The effectiveness of the countermeasure was evaluated using the general test vector leakage assessment test (TVLA test).
Information leakage could be detected in the unprotected AES implementation with the general TVLA test.
When the countermeasure was activated, however, this leakage could not be determined and hence protection is achieved.
We combine our solution combines with the state-of-the-art of side-channel attack detection and does not incur any extra overhead.
This countermeasure uses ring oscillators with runtime-configurable chain lengths to generate noise to hide the effects of the secret intermediate values on the device's power consumption.
The effectiveness of the countermeasure was evaluated using the general test vector leakage assessment test (TVLA test).
Information leakage could be detected in the unprotected AES implementation with the general TVLA test.
When the countermeasure was activated, however, this leakage could not be determined and hence protection is achieved.
We combine our solution combines with the state-of-the-art of side-channel attack detection and does not incur any extra overhead.
Event Type
Late Breaking Results Poster
TimeWednesday, July 12th6:00pm - 7:00pm PDT
LocationLevel 2 Lobby
AI
Autonomous Systems
Cloud
Design
EDA
Embedded Systems
IP
Security